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Seniority, External Labor Markets, and Faculty Pay
Abstract
We estimate the returns to seniority (the wage-tenure profile) for university faculty, and
the degree to which these returns respond to entry-level salaries (or opportunity wages)—a
relationship unexplored in work to date. Using data on faculty at a Big Ten university (ours), we
estimate elasticities of senior-faculty salaries with respect to entry-level salaries, and find that
these elasticities decline with seniority. The evidence both provides an explanation of faculty
salary compression and suggests the importance of controlling for entry-level salaries in obtaining
estimates of the returns to seniority.
1 For evidence that dislocated workers do lose much in the process of dislocation, and for a discussion of1
appropriate policies, see Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993a,b,c).
 For a review of the large literature on internal labor markets, see Osterman (1994).2
Seniority, External Labor Markets, and Faculty Pay
Byron W. Brown and Stephen A. Woodbury
A growing literature has examined the relationship between seniority with a given
employer and pay—the wage-tenure profile. The importance of this literature lies in its
implications about the relationship between pay and productivity: Human capital theory suggests
that the rising wage-tenure profile represents the returns to firm-specific investment by workers,
typically shared by the employer (Becker 1975; Oi 1962; Hashimoto 1981). Although evidence
marshalled by Brown (1989) and Topel (1991) supports this view, others have suggested that the
rising wage-tenure profile represents the effects of good job matches (Jovanovic 1979; Abraham
and Farber 1987; Altonji and Shakotko 1987) or the efforts of employers to motivate workers
(Lazear 1981; Hutchens 1987). These matters are of more than academic interest: If firm-specific
human capital cannot account for the rising wage-tenure profile, then the costs of losing a job are
far lower than would otherwise be the case. With skills that are general and portable, a worker
who loses his or her job as a result of structural change in the economy should be able to
transport those skills to another job and obtain a comparable wage. The need to compensate a
dislocated worker for lost firm-specific skills would vanish.1
Work on the academic labor market by Ransom (1993) and Hallock (1995) suggests that,
for at least one segment of the labor market, salaries actually fall with job tenure, raising
additional questions about issues surrounding the wage-tenure profile. In particular, Ransom
suggests that mobility costs of faculty and monopsony power exercised by universities are
responsible for the declining returns to seniority that are experienced by university faculty.
Hallock, however, raises some doubts about the generality of the declining wage-tenure profile
for university faculty.
In this paper, we present evidence that supports Ransom's finding of a negative return to
job tenure for faculty. More important, perhaps, we add a new wrinkle by examining how
changes in entry-level salaries are transmitted to senior faculty. This new evidence on how the
external labor market affects the wage-tenure profile is important for three reasons. First, it
suggests that, in general, the wage-tenure profile may be sensitive to market conditions at the
entry level of a workers' occupation. Second, it helps explain the severe salary compression that
occurred in academe during the 1980s; that is, the narrowing of the pay gap between junior and
senior faculty. Third, it provides evidence of a link between external and internal labor markets
that has not been documented to date.2
2We examine the returns to seniority by analyzing a ten-year file of personnel data on
individual faculty at Michigan State University (MSU). For 1981, 1986, and 1990, we estimate
salary equations that allow us to detect dramatic changes in the structure of faculty pay
determination over the decade of the 1980s. In particular, we examine changes in the returns to
seniority at MSU (or job tenure) and find that the wage-tenure profile, which began the decade
by falling moderately for faculty men and rising for faculty women, collapsed and was falling for
both men and women by the end of the decade (section III.A).
In order to estimate how changes in entry-level salaries are transmitted to senior faculty,
we augment the MSU faculty salary data with market salary data for each academic field from
American Association of Universities (AAU) member institutions. Using these data we estimate
the elasticity of senior faculty pay with respect to entry-level salaries, and find that this elasticity
varies with seniority, over time, and by gender (section III.B). Finally, we show that faculty
wage-tenure profiles are sensitive to labor market conditions at the entry-level of each academic
field (section III.C).
I. Data and Approach
To examine the returns to seniority and the transmission of entry-level salaries to more
senior faculty, we use data from computerized personnel records on all Michigan State University
(MSU) faculty as of October 1 in each year in 1981, 1986, and 1990. For present purposes, it
is simplest to think of these data as separate annual cross sections of faculty records. The
information available on each faculty member includes individual characteristics such as gender,
ethnicity, and birth year, as well as variables on faculty status such as salary, rank, year of
appointment, percent of time employed, departmental unit, highest degree earned, year in which
the highest degree was earned, veteran status, and handicapper status. Although we use most of
these data directly, they allow us in addition to construct unusually rich measures of labor market
experience that can be interpreted within a human capital framework.
We supplement these MSU personnel records with data on average salary of assistant
professors in each faculty member's field at other American Association of Universities (AAU)
institutions (see below). The AAU data on entry-level market salaries provide a measure of the
market opportunities facing each faculty member we observe.
The only obvious deficiency of this data set is the lack of information on productivity—
measures of research output and teaching competence, for example. MSU does not maintain a
centralized file of such information, and the cost (to us) of building such records would be
prohibitive. Nevertheless, it will turn out that roughly 60 to 70 percent of the cross-sectional
variation in tenure system faculty salaries can be explained with the data that are available to us.
This ability to explain so much of the variation in faculty salaries without additional controls for
productivity is striking in itself.
3See also Rosen's (1992) highly useful discussion of the development of the Mincerian earnings function.3
Our analysis of these data proceeds as follows. In section II we specify a salary function
for three annual cross sections of data—1981, 1986, and 1990. For each year we partition the
sample into two sub-groups—tenure system faculty men and tenure system faculty women (we
do not consider temporary faculty because job tenure for temporary faculty is by definition
limited). Estimates of these salary functions, reported in section III, yield evidence of changes
in the structure of faculty pay over the decade of the 1980s—the returns to seniority, the
transmission of the entry-level salary in a field to faculty with up to 25 years of seniority, and the
sensitivity of wage-tenure profiles to entry-level salaries.
II. Salary Functions
The models we estimate are based on the well-known earnings function developed by
Jacob Mincer (1974), which in its pure form specifies the natural logarithm of annual earnings
to be a linear function of years of schooling and a quadratic function of labor market experience.3
We modify the pure Mincerian earnings function in five ways.
First, we measure the specific effect of seniority at MSU (job tenure), in contrast to total
labor market experience, by including years at MSU (SENIORITY) nonlinearly as explained
below. Second, we include a measure of the opportunity wage—specifically the (log of) average
salary of tenure system assistant professors in the faculty member's field at other AAU
universities (ln AAUSAL). Third, for faculty with a doctorate, we include measures of total labor
market experience (at MSU and elsewhere) both before and after obtaining the doctorate
(EXPREDOC and EXPOSTDOC), in a functional form discussed further below. For faculty who
have not obtained a doctorate, we include a standard quadratic function of experience,
(OTHEREXP and OTHEREXP ). Fourth, our only "schooling" variable is whether the faculty2
member had not obtained a doctorate (NO DOCTORATE). Finally, we include a set of J control
variables (X , j = 1, ..., J) to capture the effects of appointment status (for example, percentagej
less than full time and whether the faculty member was on 12-month or 10-month appointment),
and individual characteristics such as veteran status, handicapper status, and ethnicity.
Accordingly, the salary functions we estimate can be written:
ln SALARY = a  + a (SENIORITY/100) + a (SENIORITY )/1000 (1)0 1 2
2
+ (ln AAUSAL)[a +a (SENIORITY/10)+a (SENIORITY /100)] +3 4 5
2
b (EXPREDOC/100) + b (EXPREDOC /1000) + b (EXPOSTDOC/100) +1 2 3
2
b (EXPOSTDOC /1000) + b (EXPREDOC*EXPOSTDOC/1000) +4 5
2
b (OTHEREXP/100) + b (OTHEREXP /1000) + c X  + e6 7 j j j
2
where the dependent variable (ln SALARY) is the natural logarithm of a faculty member's annual
contract salary on October 1 of the given year. Definitions of all variables are displayed in
4This means that the number of schools on which the "market" salary is based varies by field. It is not4
uncommon for a university to supply data to AAU for some of its departments and not others. In addition, the number
of responding universities in a field varies from year to year, with a trend toward more universities participating in the
data exchange in later years. We have also constructed average salaries for just the Big Ten universities (a more
consistent sample) and have used them to obtain estimates. The results are essential similar.
Elimination of faculty from the sample due to missing AAU salary information reduced the sample size by 325
percent in 1981, 23 percent  in 1986, and 19 percent in 1990. The vast majority of the loss was in medical school faculty.
See Table 2 for missing departments in 1981.
An alternative way to measure the effect on salary of being in a particular field is to include in the regression6
a set of dummy variables for academic departments. The coefficients of the dummy variables then measure percentage
differences in salary across departments. We implemented this approach before we acquired the AAU data, and have
found that the AAU data do equally well in explaining interdepartmental variation in salaries. Hence, using the AAU
salary variable is preferred both on economic grounds and for reasons of parsimony (one variable rather than 50-odd).
Table 1. With the exception of ln AAUSAL, all variables in equation (1) are specific to faculty
member i in year t, so we have suppressed subscripts for simplicity. The entry-level salary
variable (ln AAUSAL) is assigned to each faculty member according to his or her department in
year t; it is entered as deviations from the total sample mean in year t.
Four features of this specification deserve further mention. First, an extensive literature
(cited in the introduction) has grown in the past decade in which the returns to seniority with a
given employer (or job tenure) have been distinguished from the returns to total work experience.
In a human capital framework, the returns to seniority have been interpreted as returns to firm-
specific training, whereas the returns to total experience have been interpreted as returns to
general training, although other interpretations are possible (see the review by Hutchens 1989).
For example, Ransom's (1993) findings suggest that greater seniority implies higher mobility
costs, which in the presence of monopsony power could lead to lower pay.
Implementing the distinction between seniority and general experience is straightforward
in the data we are using: We measure the effect of MSU seniority, in contrast to total postdoctoral
experience, by including each faculty member's years at MSU (SENIORITY) and its square. (We
discuss general experience further below.)
Second, we append to each faculty member's annual record the average salary of assistant
professors in his or her field at American Association of Universities (AAU) institutions (ln
AAUSAL). These data on entry-level market salaries are gathered by the American Association
of Universities Data Exchange (AAUDE). We have organized the data for comparability with
MSU departments;  however, because we do not have AAU salary reports for all fields4
represented at MSU, our sample size is reduced somewhat.  Table 2 lists the included5
departments, shows the average AAU salary (AAUSAL) by field for 1981, 1986, and 1990 for
participating institutions (excluding MSU), and gives the average annual growth rates of salaries
between 1981 and 1990.6
5The market salary data are interesting in their own right for what they reveal about the
academic labor market over the 1980s. The biggest winners—those with annual salary growth
rates above 7 percent—were certain fields in business (finance, accounting, marketing, and
management) and engineering (computer science and electrical engineering). A sprinkling of other
fields—chemical and civil engineering, geography, and labor and industrial relations—fared nearly
as well. Faculty in most of these fields had existing or improving opportunities outside academe,
explaining their relatively rapid salary increases.
Fields that fared relatively poorly—with annual salary growth rates under 6
percent—tended to be concentrated in agriculture and natural resources, the natural sciences and
nursing, and the arts and humanities. Again, opportunities outside academe—or lack of such
opportunities—go far toward explaining the composition of fields in this list.
In equation (1), we include the natural logarithm of the AAU entry-level salary for a
faculty member's field (ln AAUSAL), and interact ln AAUSAL with both SENIORITY and the
square of SENIORITY. This interaction allows the impact of market salary on the current salary
of senior faculty to vary with seniority. If mobility costs of faculty increase with seniority, and
if the university has monopsony power to exercise, then we would expect the influence of
increases in AAU market salaries on the salaries of senior faculty to fall as seniority rises.
Third, the specification includes two sets of general experience variables—one for faculty
members who have a doctorate and another for those who do not. For faculty who have a
doctorate, we follow Johnson and Stafford (1974) in distinguishing between labor market
experience obtained before receipt of the doctorate and experience obtained after receipt of the
doctorate. This distinction is important because predoctoral skills and experience often cannot be
transferred to the profession that is pursued after the doctorate. If this is so, then we would expect
a substantial difference between the estimated returns to experience obtained before and after the
doctorate. Accordingly, we include the number of years of experience before receiving the
doctorate and its square (EXPREDOC and EXPREDOC ), the number of years of experience2
since receiving the doctorate and its square (EXPOSTDOC and EXPOSTDOC ), and the2
interaction pre- and postdoctoral experience. In general, we expect to find higher returns to
postdoctoral than to predoctoral experience (b  > b  > 0), with diminishing returns to both (b ,3 1 2
b  < 0), and with faculty who obtained their doctorate later in their life earning a lower return4
to postdoctoral experience (b  < 0). For faculty who have not obtained the doctorate, we include5
a standard quadratic function of experience (OTHEREXP and OTHEREXP ).2
Fourth, given the way we have specified the variables, the intercept of equation (1) has
a direct interpretation for each subsample. Specifically, the intercept, a , is the ln SALARY of a0
white, untenured assistant professor who has just earned a doctorate and arrived at MSU straight
from graduate school (that is, has no MSU seniority or postdoctoral experience), is not a
department chair, is on a full-time academic year appointment, is not a military veteran, is not
6A number of studies have related salaries and salary increases to research productivity measured by citations7
of published work; for example, Hamermesh (1989). But for some departments, such as music and art, citations would
not be a very good proxy for productivity. The same is true of departments with lower research expectations but a heavy
commitment to public service or extension work.
handicapped, and is in the field with the average market (AAU) salary.  Since it makes sense to7
observe returns to seniority and experience with respect to an entry-level faculty member, this
average white assistant professor makes a natural "reference" faculty member.
III.  Results of Estimation
Tables 3 and 4 display estimates of the coefficients of main interest in equation (1), for
tenure system faculty men and tenure system faculty women in 1981, 1986, and 1990. Separate
salary functions for men and women allow all coefficients to be different for faculty men and
women, and this flexibility turns out to be important in interpreting differences between faculty
men and women in salary determination.
Depending on the year, the estimated salary functions explain between 58 and 72 percent
of the variation in individual tenure system faculty salaries. This explanatory power is striking,
given that the regressions include only seniority, the opportunity wage (AAU market salary),
postdoctoral experience, and a few other explanatory variables (not displayed in the tables).
A. Returns to Seniority and Experience
What are the returns to seniority and postdoctoral experience for this group of university
faculty? Have the wage-tenure and wage-experience profiles changed over the years? Do they
differ for men and women? Table 5 displays wage-tenure and wage-experience profiles based on
the estimated coefficients shown in Tables 3 and 4. Specifically, Table 5 shows the difference in
ln SALARY between a faculty member with no seniority (top panel) or postdoctoral experience
(middle panel) and a faculty member with 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years of seniority or postdoctoral
experience (see the notes to Table 5 for computational details). Since equation (1) is in
logarithmic terms, these can be read as approximate proportional salary differences (so that -0.02
is a negative differential of 2 percent). Different profiles are shown for 1981, 1986, and 1990.
1. Returns to seniority. The top panel of Table 5 shows that (usually) greater seniority
reduces faculty salaries, other things equal. To understand these estimated wage-tenure profiles,
consider 6 faculty men with 25 years of postdoctoral experience. The first has just been hired by
the university, the second has 5 years of university seniority, and the others have 10, 15, 20, and
25 years of seniority, respectively. In 1990, the faculty member with 5 years of seniority would
have earned 3 percent less than the newly hired faculty member, the faculty member with 10
years of seniority would have earned 6 percent less than the newly hired faculty member, and so
on, as shown in the 1990 row of the top panel of Table 5.
7The returns to seniority fell dramatically for both faculty men and women during the
1980s. They are particularly large and negative for men in 1986 and 1990. For example, 25 years
of university seniority reduced a faculty man's salary by 15 percent in 1986 and by 13 percent
in 1990. The only positive returns to seniority are for faculty women in 1981.
2. Returns to experience. The middle panel of Table 5 shows the returns to postdoctoral
experience (with SENIORITY set to 0). To understand these wage-experience profiles, consider
six faculty members who have just been appointed to the university. The first has just left
graduate school and has no postdoctoral experience, the second has 5 years of postdoctoral
experience, and the others have 10, 15, 20, and 25 years of experience, respectively. In 1990,
the new hire with 5 years of experience would have earned 15 percent more than the new hire just
out of graduate school, the new hire with 10 years of experience would have earned 29 percent
more than the new hire just out of graduate school, and so on, as shown in the 1990 row of the
middle panel of Table 5.
Table 5 shows that, for men, the returns to experience fell during the 1980s. For example,
a faculty man joining the university with 25 years of experience in 1981 earned 66 percent more
than a new Ph.D.; by 1990 the premium was only 56 percent.
Women, on the other hand, saw an increase in returns to experience over the decade. For
example, the return to 25 years of postdoctoral experience rose from 38 percent in 1981 to 45
percent in 1990.
3. Total returns. The bottom panel of Table 5 shows the combined effects of seniority and
postdoctoral experience. Here, we assume seniority equals postdoctoral experience and sum the
returns to each. The estimates suggest that the return to 25 years of combined seniority and
postdoctoral experience fell over the decade from 61 to 43 percent for men, and from 54 to 39
percent for women.
What can account for these declining returns to seniority and postdoctoral experience? On
the supply side of faculty labor markets, the output of new Ph.D.s fell dramatically during the
1980s, partly because of demographic shifts (there were fewer men and women of traditional
graduate school age as the decade progressed), and partly because of reduced expectations about
employment prospects (Bowen and Sosa, 1989, chapter 6). This tightening supply, along with
normal flows of faculty turnover (retirement and other forms of attrition), put upward pressure
on starting salaries for new Ph.D.s in many fields.
On the demand side, the 1980s were a time of contraction for higher education generally
as enrollments fell (Bowen and Sosa, 1989, chapter 3). Public higher education in Michigan was
subject to the same pressures as the "industry" as a whole. In addition, the Michigan economy
suffered from high unemployment early in the decade and went through major restructuring as
the decade progressed. State support for public higher education suffered accordingly.
8So it seems likely that the collapsing returns to seniority and postdoctoral experience seen
in Table 5 resulted from an effort by deans and other administrators to pay competitive salaries
to new faculty in the face of stagnating budgets. This could be viewed either as exploiting the
presence of mobility costs for faculty with many years of postdoctoral experience (Ransom 1993),
or as squeezing out some of the economic rents that may be associated with academic tenure (the
promise of a lifetime job).
B. Faculty Salaries and External Labor Markets
How responsive are the salaries of senior faculty to changes in the market for entry-level
faculty? We address this question by using the estimates of equation (1) to compute the elasticity
of current salary (i.e., the salary of senior faculty) with respect to the entry-level salary in that
faculty member's field (i.e., the average salary of assistant professors in AAU institutions). Since
this elasticity varies with seniority, we denote it by  and retrieve it from equation (1) bySEN
differentiating with respect to ln AAUSAL:
=  ln SALARY /  ln AAUSALSEN
= a  + a (SENIORITY/10) + a (SENIORITY /100). (2)3 4 5
2
Equation (2) makes clear the dependence of  on the level of seniority of a faculty member.SEN
Table 6 gives estimates of  for tenure system faculty by gender for different levelsSEN
of seniority. For example, suppose that the AAU market salary increased by 10 percent in
Economics in 1990. Then a male Economics professor with 10 years of seniority would expect
to realize a salary increase of about 6.5 percent (since  equals .65 in 1990).10
Four points about the relationship between the external labor market and salaries of senior
faculty seem clear. First, the greater is seniority, the less a change in market wages tends to
influence salary. That is,  falls as seniority rises. A woman in 1990 with 5 years of senioritySEN
would see her salary rise by 52 percent of an increase the entry-level salary. But a woman with
15 years seniority would see an increase of only 5 percent of the entry-level increase. Rapid
increases in market salaries therefore lead to salary compression—booming fields will see smaller
pay gaps between senior and junior faculty than will fields with modest market wage increases.
That  falls with seniority is consistent with Ransom's hypotheses about faculty members' lackSEN
of mobility and universities' exercise of monopsony power.
Second, the salaries of senior faculty men tend to be more responsive to changes in entry-
level salaries than are the salaries of senior faculty women. That is,  is greater for men thanSEN
women for any given level of seniority. In 1990, for example,  was .65 for men but only .2410
for women. This has implications for the gender gap in wages: For faculty members in fields with
rapidly rising salaries, say finance or engineering, the evidence suggests that senior faculty men
would tend to enjoy a larger salary boost than faculty women.
9Third (and related to the second point), the decrease in  as seniority increases isSEN
markedly greater for women than for men. That is, as we read across comparable rows of Table
6, the reduction in elasticity with increased seniority is more pronounced for women. For men
in 1990,  fell from .69 to .59 as seniority rose from 5 to 15 years, but for women itSEN
plummeted from .52 to .05. Senior faculty women are less successful than senior faculty men in
obtaining salary increases when the market for their field improves. So the gender gap in wages
should tend to increase with seniority.
Finally, salaries of senior faculty men tended to be more responsive to entry-level salaries
in 1990 than in 1981, but salaries of senior faculty women became less responsive. The difference
between faculty men and women may be explainable by the concentration of women in relatively
low-paying fields; that is, fields in which the labor market was relatively slack, such as English,
history, and other humanities. The argument is as follows. The 1980s were a time of tight budgets
in most universities, so that administrative decisions were more constrained by—and had to
respond more to—the market. With tight budgets, administrators look at departments whose
markets are slack and are unlikely to provide salary adjustments in excess of the bare minimum
needed to retain faculty. But they may need to provide significant salary adjustments to
departments operating in tight markets even in difficult times in order to recruit and retain faculty.
Tight budgets, then, should lead to both greater salary dispersion across departments and greater
internal responsiveness to external faculty labor markets. Since, again, faculty women tend to be
in slack segments of the faculty labor market, we would expect to see the salaries of senior faculty
women respond less to changes in the entry-level market.
These results make two points clear. First, the elasticity of senior faculty salaries with
respect to entry-level salaries ( ) falls with seniority, consistent with Ransom's hypothesesSEN
about faculty members' lack of mobility and universities' exercise of monopsony power. Second,
 is greater for men than for women, falls more rapidly for women than for men, andSEN
increased for men during the 1980s (whereas it fell for women). These findings suggest that
gender-based pay gaps may be complex in origin, and that policies to reduce such gaps may be
subverted in subtle ways by interactions between the external and internal labor markets of the
university.
C. Wage-Tenure Profiles and the External Labor Market
The results in Table 6 show that the elasticity of senior faculty salaries with respect to
entry-level salaries ( ) is always less than 1 and falls with seniority. It follows that in higher-SEN
wage fields that are experiencing wage growth, we would expect to see relatively small wage gaps
between junior and senior faculty—that is, salary compression or relatively low returns to
seniority. In lower-wage fields that are stagnating, we would expect higher (or less negative)
returns to seniority.
Calculations displayed in Table 7 bear out these expectations. Using the AAU salary data
in Table 2, we have chosen three fields—Accounting, Chemistry, and Social Work—to represent
10
fields in which salaries grew at high, medium, and low rates during the 1980s. Table 7 shows the
wage-tenure profiles for faculty men in these three fields in 1981, 1986, and 1990 (see the table
notes for computational details).
In the low- and medium-growth fields, Social Work and Chemistry, the returns to 25 years
of seniority were -10 to -12 percent in 1986 and 1990. These are substantial negative returns, but
they are dwarfed by the negative returns to seniority that are experienced by Accounting
professors: Accounting faculty with just 10 years of seniority had returns of -8 to -16 percent
during the 1980s; those with 20 years of seniority had returns of -18 to -35 percent. The booming
entry-level market for Accounting faculty led to salary compression with a vengeance.
In summary, the wage-tenure profile is sensitive to conditions in the external labor market.
This sensitivity suggests the importance of accounting for occupational market conditions in
constructing and evaluating wage-tenure profiles. The average wage-tenure profiles that have been
examined in most work on the subject may mask variation that is important to understanding the
relationship between wages and seniority.
IV. Discussion and Conclusions
Most existing evidence suggests that wages rise with job tenure, although the reason for
the rising wage-tenure profile has been widely debated. Ransom (1993) has shown that at least
one nonnegligible segment of the labor market—the market for college and university
professors—experiences negative returns to job tenure. As Ransom points out, these negative
returns are consistent with the existence of mobility costs for faculty and the exercise of
monopsony power by universities. Hallock (1995) examines one university where the returns to
seniority appear not to be negative. We show that there is variation in the returns to seniority over
time within a university (Table 5), and that variations in the conditions of the entry market in an
academic field can influence the wage-tenure profile (Tables 6 and 7).
The finding of a flat or negative return to job tenure suggests the unimportance of
university-specific skills in academic labor markets. Because the teaching and research skills of
university professors are readily transferrable from one setting to another, this unimportance
makes sense. It is, of course, both a bane and a blessing: It allows faculty to take leaves of
absence and sabbaticals in exotic (and less than exotic) locales, but it leads to a situation where
immobility is taken as a signal of weak general skills.
It seems likely that university faculty and other Ph.D.-level professionals whose work
centers on knowledge, information, and research are unusual in having jobs in which general
skills are so important, and specific skills so unimportant. Many other professionals who have
post-baccalaureate training, such as physicians and lawyers, maintain on-going relationships with
patients and clients, face licensing requirements, and deal with state-specific institutional
peculiarities, all of which suggest the importance of specific skills. We would also speculate that
11
Although much discussed in faculty clubs, there has been little written on salary compression and differences8
across disciplines. For an exception, see Hamermesh (1988).
engineers and other scientific personnel in the private sector would experience the positive returns
to job tenure that have been documented generally (e.g., Topel 1991), since they often work in
organizations that use unique or specialized processes.
The declining returns to both seniority and postdoctoral experience that are documented
in Table 5 confirm the widespread belief that the 1980s were a period of salary compression
among academics; that is, a time when pay gaps between junior and senior faculty narrowed.  We8
speculate that two main factors are responsible for this salary compression: falling supplies of
new Ph.D.s in many fields, and tightening university budgets, which led administrators to meet
the demand for replacement faculty by paying competitive (and higher) entry level salaries and
allowing existing pay gaps between experienced and inexperienced faculty to shrink. In particular,
rapid increases in starting salaries in business and scientific fields (including engineering) appear
to have pulled up campus-wide average salaries while only marginally benefitting more
experienced faculty or faculty outside of business and science. Hence, the growth of starting
salaries in some fields may have led to both salary compression and greater pay disparities across
fields.
In addition to examining the returns to seniority, we have examined the relationship
between entry-level salaries and the salaries of senior faculty. Our results (see Table 6) suggest
that the elasticity of senior faculty salaries with respect to the entry-level salary ( ) falls withSEN
seniority, is greater for men than for women, falls more rapidly for women than for men, and
increased for men during the 1980s (whereas it fell for women). To our knowledge, these are the
first estimates of this kind. Presumably, salary compression would have been even greater than
it actually was during the 1980s if  had not increased for faculty men during the decade.SEN
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of the wage-tenure profile in a given field to the
conditions in the entry-level market in that field (Table 7). As expected, the returns to seniority
are far more negative in a booming field (such as Accounting) than in low- and medium-growth
fields (such as Social Work and Chemistry). Salary compression, then, is far greater in fields that
have a booming entry-level market than in other fields. This sensitivity of the wage-tenure profile
to conditions in the external labor market suggests the importance of accounting for market
conditions in an occupation when constructing and evaluating wage-tenure profiles.
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Table 1
Variable Definitions
Dependent Variable
  ln SALARY = natural logarithm of annual salary on October 1 of each year.
Job Tenure
  SENIORITY = number of years since first faculty appointment at MSU (excluding
years of nonappointment after initial appointment).
Opportunity Wage
  ln AAUSAL = natural logarithm of the average salary of assistant professors in
AAU universities, in the faculty member's field.
Experience
  EXPREDOC For persons with doctorate, number of years in excess of four
taken to obtain the doctorate.  Equals 0 for persons without
doctorate. 
  EXPOSTDOC For persons with doctorate, years of experience since receiving
doctorate.  If year of doctorate is unknown, we assumed it was
received at age 26.  Equals 0 for persons without doctorate.  
  OTHEREXP For persons without doctorate, years of experience since highest
degree.  Equals 0 for persons with doctorate.
Degree status
  NO DOCTORATE = 1 if person lacks doctorate, else 0.
Appointment status
  CHAIR/DIRECTOR = 1 if person is a chairperson or a director, else 0.
  ASST CHAIR/
DIRECTOR = 1 if person is an assistant chairperson or assistant director, else 0.
  DISTINGUISHED = 1 if person holds a "distinguished" rank, else 0.
  12 MONTH = 1 if on 12 month appointment, else 0.
  % < FULL TIME = 100 minus percent time employed.
Ethnicity
  BLACK = 1 if Black, else 0.
  ASIAN = 1 if Asian/Pacific Islander, else 0.
  HISPANIC = 1 if Hispanic, else 0.
  NATIVE = 1 if Native American, else 0.
  OTHER = 1 if other ethnicity, else 0.
Veteral Status
  VNVET = 1 if Viet Nam veteran, else 0.
  NONVNVET = 1 if veteran, but not Viet Nam veteran, else 0.
Handicapper Status
  HCAPACC = 1 if handicapped and special accommodation is required, else 0.
  HCAPNAC = 1 if handicapped and no special accommodation is required, else 0.
Table 2
AAU Average Salaries of Assistant Professors
by Department, Excluding MSU
1981 1986 1990 
Avg. Annual
Growth Rate
1981-90
Twelve Month Departments:
Agriculture and Natural Resources
  Agriculture Economics
  Agriculture Engineering
  Animal Science
  Crop & Soil Science
  Forestry
  Botany & Plant Pathology
  Food Science
Communication Arts
  Audiology
Natural Sciences
  Microbiology
  Entomology
  Biochemistry
Medical Sciences
  Pharmacology
  Physiology
  Anatomy
28590 
28367 
na
26727 
26829 
26402 
26700 
25934 
30502 
26869 
28608 
29774 
30387 
29891 
36820 
40398 
36483 
36165 
33876 
35997 
34403 
29534 
38920 
34952 
34535 
37480 
38755 
37876 
45518 
49614 
45297 
44524 
42446 
43653 
43680 
39297 
48877 
44631 
44562 
45934 
50365 
45248 
5.30 
6.41 
6.34*
5.83 
5.23
5.75 
5.62 
4.73 
5.38 
5.80 
5.05 
4.94 
5.77 
4.71 
Ten Month Departments:
Arts and Humanities
  Art
  English
  History
  Linguistics
  Music
  Philosophy
  Roman & Classical Languages
  Theatre
Business
  Accounting
  Economics
  Finance
  Management
  Marketing & Trans. Admin.
Communication Arts
  Communication
  Journalism
18730 
19135 
19830 
na
19467 
19030 
19473 
19515 
28764 
22982 
na
26817 
26435 
20099 
21541 
24418 
24789 
25994 
25850 
25310 
25483 
25129 
25261 
44479 
32797 
40767 
39573 
37445 
26484 
28803 
31358 
31179 
32395 
32557 
31378 
33483 
31716 
30873 
59414 
41979 
58770 
53297 
51160 
33345 
35399 
5.89 
5.57 
5.60 
5.44** 
5.45 
6.48 
5.57 
5.23 
8.39 
6.92 
8.58* 
7.93 
7.61 
5.79 
5.67 
Table 2
(Continued)
1981 1986 1990 
Avg. Annual
Growth Rate
1981-90
Ten Month Departments (Continued):
Education
  Education Administration
  Couns. & Ed. Psychology
  Physical Education & Exercise
Science
  Teacher Education
Engineering
  Chemical Engineering
  Civil Engineering
  Computer Science
  Electrical Engineering
  Mechanical Engineering
  Met., Mech. & Mat. Sci.
Natural Science
  Chemistry
  Geology
  Mathematics
  Microbiology & P.H.
  Physics
  Statistics
  Zoology
Social Sciences
  Anthropology
  Geography
  Labor & Industrial Relations
  Political Science
  Psychology
  Sociology
  Social Work
Medical Sciences
  Nursing
na
na
20616 
na
27300 
25228 
25946 
26637 
26676 
26136 
21539 
23203 
20773 
24805 
23396 
23079 
22150 
20180 
19923 
25588 
20528 
19708 
19839 
23124 
20684 
31468 
26595 
26990 
27203
39383 
36624 
39543 
40375 
38829 
38393 
29869 
29870 
28381 
31631 
32977 
29532 
30183
 
30696 
28375 
30239 
27059 
27349 
26782 
28847 
29449 
36587 
34595 
33771
 
33985
49330 
46165 
47985 
49542 
46816 
47385 
38009 
36372 
36714 
38741 
41500 
39245 
38285
 
32278 
35973 
49175 
34592 
34807 
35189 
34918 
37052 
6.64* 
6.01*
5.64
5.96* 
6.79 
6.94 
7.07 
7.14 
6.45 
6.83
6.51 
5.12 
6.53 
5.08 
6.58 
6.08 
6.27 
5.36 
6.79 
7.53 
5.97 
6.52 
6.57 
4.69 
6.69 
* Based on 1983 salaries.  ** Based on 1982 salaries. 
Table 3
Estimated Earnings Functions for Tenure System Men Faculty,
1981, 1986, and 1990
(Dependent variable = ln SALARY)
1981 1986 1990
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
OLS
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
OLS
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
OLS
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
INTERCEPT 1.000
(--)
9.923
(0.020)
1.000
(--)
10.294
(0.024)
1.000
(--)
10.544
(0.029)
Job Tenure
SENIORITY/100
(mean unscaled)
SENIORITY²/1000
15.349
(8.983)
--
-0.338
(0.267)
0.049
(0.064)
16.551
(9.558)
--
-0.992
(0.277)
0.154
(0.067)
17.548
(9.794)
--
-0.734
(0.297)
0.087
(0.076)
Opportunity wage
ln AAUSAL
(dev. from total sample mean) 
ln AAUSAL*SENIORITY/10
ln AAUSAL*SENIORITY²/100
0.011
(0.155)
--
--
0.704
(0.094)
-0.234
(0.111)
-0.003
(0.029)
0.020
(0.165)
--
--
0.910
(0.087)
-0.226
(0.107)
-0.002
(0.030)
0.023
(0.168)
--
--
0.724
(0.099)
-0.053
(0.124)
-0.024
(0.034)
Experience
EXPREDOC/100
(mean unscaled)
EXPREDOC²/1000
EXPOSTDOC/100
(mean unscaled)
EXPOSTDOC²/1000
EXPREDOC*EXPOSTDOC/1000
OTHEREXP/100
OTHEREXP²/1000
3.716
(4.133)
--
15.111
(9.694)
--
--
1.423
(6.093)
--
-0.264
(0.380)
0.356
(0.154)
4.332
(0.299)
-0.605
(0.067)
-0.366
(0.150)
2.335
(0.326)
-0.282
(0.047)
3.861
(3.958)
--
16.595
(10.320)
--
--
1.351
(6.056)
--
-0.671
(0.451)
0.536
(0.200)
3.931
(0.326)
-0.520
(0.071)
-0.290
(0.166)
2.266
(0.373)
-0.233
(0.049)
3.976
(4.072)
--
17.721
(10.302)
--
--
1.187
(5.820)
--
-0.478
(0.512)
0.201
(0.194)
3.387
(0.365)
-0.421
(0.081)
-0.226
(0.190)
2.379
(0.451)
-0.221
(0.053)
Adjusted R² 0.724 0.647 0.581
Sample size 1035 1156 1163
Notes:  The equations also control for each faculty member's degree status, appointment
status, ethnicity, veteran status, and handicapper status.  Table 1 provides definitions of all
included variables.
Table 4
Estimated Earnings Functions for Tenure System Faculty Women,
1981, 1986, and 1990
(Dependent variable = ln SALARY)
1981 1986 1990
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
OLS
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
OLS
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
OLS
Coefficient
(Std. Error)
INTERCEPT 1.000
(--)
9.899
(0.046)
1.000
(--)
10.232
(0.044)
1.000
(--)
10.471
(0.040)
Job Tenure
SENIORITY/100
(mean unscaled)
SENIORITY²/1000
9.703
(7.725)
--
1.908
(0.600)
-0.503
(0.174)
10.834
(7.817)
--
-0.395
(0.595)
0.162
(0.192)
10.887
(8.021)
--
-0.909
(0.526)
0.263
(0.174)
Opportunity wage
ln AAUSAL
(dev. from total sample mean) 
ln AAUSAL*SENIORITY/10
ln AAUSAL*SENI0RITY²/100
-0.053
(0.144)
--
--
0.910
(0.178)
-0.672
(0.280)
0.120
(0.077)
-0.058
(0.139)
--
--
0.889
(0.160)
-0.767
(0.299)
0.194
(0.108)
-0.050
(0.148)
--
--
0.898
(0.159)
-0.854
(0.290)
0.192
(0.099)
Experience
EXPREDOC/100
(mean unscaled)
EXPREDOC²/1000
EXPOSTDOC/100
(mean unscaled)
EXPOSTDOC²/1000
EXPREDOC*EXPOSTDOC/10
00
OTHEREXP/100
OTHEREXP²/1000
3.277
(4.453)
--
6.342
(8.056)
--
--
4.626
(8.398)
--
0.802
(0.911)
-0.696
(0.423)
1.310
(0.772)
0.033
(0.232)
0.239
(0.515)
0.050
(0.747)
0.236
(0.217)
4.461
(5.052)
--
8.115
(7.873)
--
--
4.074
(9.088)
--
-0.202
(0.780)
0.345
(0.310)
3.265
(0.668)
-0.425
(0.199)
-0.454
(0.349)
0.491
(1.051)
0.114
(0.245)
5.766
(6.320)
--
10.148
(8.332)
--
--
2.271
(7.257)
--
0.554
(0.423)
-0.041
(0.079)
3.232
(0.586)
-0.487
(0.176)
-0.409
(0.263)
0.802
(1.231)
0.031
(0.289)
Adjusted R² 0.711 0.642 0.622
Sample size 155 217 291
Notes:  See Table 3.
Table 5
Returns to Seniority and Postdoctoral Experience
for Tenure System Faculty
Men Women
Years of Seniority or
Postdoctoral Experience
Years of Seniority or
Postdoctoral Experience
Year 5 10 15 20 25 5 10 15 20 25
Returns to Seniority (holding postdoctoral experience constant)
1981 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.10 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.21
1986 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.16  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03 0.04
1990 -0.04 -0.07 -0.09 -0.12 -0.14 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Returns to Postdoctoral Experience (setting SENIORITY=0)
1981 0.20 0.36 0.49 0.60 0.67 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.20 0.37
1986 0.18 0.33 0.46 0.56 0.63 0.14 0.26 0.36 0.44 0.50
1990 0.15 0.29 0.40 0.49 0.56 0.14 0.25 0.34 0.40 0.44
Total Returns when EXPOSTDOC=SENIORITY
1981 0.18 0.33 0.45 0.54 0.61 0.17 0.31 0.43 0.52 0.58
1986 0.13 0.24 0.33 0.41 0.47 0.15 0.27 0.38 0.47 0.54
1990 0.12 0.22 0.31 0.37 0.43 0.12 0.22 0.31 0.38 0.43
Notes:  Returns to seniority (top panel) are computed from the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 by
setting ln AAUSAL equal to the subgroup mean (.011, .020, and .023 for men in 1981, 1986,
and 1990; -.053, -.058, and -.050 for women in 1981, 1986, and 1990) and setting all other
right-hand-side variables in equation (1) to zero, except SENIORITY.  When SENIORITY is
then set to 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25, equation (1) yields estimates of the proportional returns to
5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years of seniority.  Returns to postdoctoral experience (middle panel)
are computed similarly:  Set all right-hand-side variables in equation (1) to zero, except
EXPOSTDOC, which is set to 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 to yield estimates of the returns to 5, 10,
15, 20, and 25 years of postdoctoral experience (the sample mean of EXPREDOC is used in
the EXPREDOC*EXPOSTDOC interaction term).  Total returns (bottom panel) are the sum of
returns to seniority and postdoctoral experience.
Table 6
Elasticity of Senior Faculty Salaries with Respect to 
Entry-Level Salary ( ), by Gender and SenioritySEN
Tenure System Men Tenure System Women
Years of Seniority Years of Seniority
Year 0 5 10 15 20 0 5 10 15 20
1981 0.70 0.59 0.47 0.35 0.22 0.91 0.60 0.36 0.17 0.05
1986 0.91 0.80 0.68 0.57 0.45 0.89 0.55 0.32 0.18 0.13
1990 0.72 0.69 0.65 0.59 0.52 0.90 0.52 0.24 0.05 -
0.04
Notes:  The elasticities are derived from the estimated earnings functions in Tables 3 and 4 by
setting SENIORITY equal to the specified number of years (0, 5, 10, 15, or 20), and
differentiating with respect to ln AAUSAL.
Table 7
Wage-Tenure Profiles for Faculty Men in Low-, Medium-,and High-Growth Fields
Years of Seniority
5 10 15 20 25
Social Work
1981
1986
1990
-0.01
-0.04
-0.03
-0.03
-0.06
-0.06
-0.03
-0.09
-0.07
-0.04
-0.10
-0.09
-0.05
-0.10
-0.10
Chemistry 
1981
1986
1990
-0.01
-0.04
-0.03
-0.01
-0.07
-0.06
-0.01
-0.10
-0.09
-0.01 
-0.11
-0.10
-0.00
-0.12
-0.12
Accounting
1981
1986
1990
-0.04
-0.09
-0.05
-0.08
-0.16
-0.10
-0.11
-0.23
-0.14
-0.15
-0.30
-0.19
-0.18
-0.35
-0.24
Notes:  Returns to seniority are computed from the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 by setting ln AAUSAL equal to the
subgroup mean (-.016, -.084, and -.121 for Social Work in 1981, 1986, and 1990; -.087, -.049, and -.036 for
Chemistry in 1981, 1986, and 1990; and .202, .349, and .410 for Accounting in 1981, 1986, and 1990) and setting
all other right-hand-side variables in equation (1) to zero, except SENIORITY.  When SENIORITY is then set to 5,
10, 15, 20, and 25, equation (1) yields estimates of the proportional returns to 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25 years of
seniority.
